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Abstract—Network services are among the riskiest programs
executed by production systems. Such services execute large
quantities of complex code and process data from arbitrary
— and untrusted — network sources, often with high levels of
system privilege. It is desirable to confine system services to a
least-privileged environment so that the potential damage from
a malicious attacker can be limited, but existing mechanisms
for sandboxing services require invasive and system-specific code
changes and are insufficient to confine broad classes of network
services.
Rather than sandboxing one service at a time, we propose
that the best place to add sandboxing to network services is in
the service manager that starts those services. As a first step
towards this vision, we propose CapExec, a process supervisor
that can execute a single service within a sandbox based on a
service declaration file in which, required resources whose limited
access to are supported by Caper services, are specified. Using the
Capsicum compartmentalization framework and its Casper ser-
vice framework, CapExec provides robust application sandboxing
without requiring any modifications to the application itself. We
believe that this is a first step towards ubiquitous sandboxing of
network services without the costs of virtualization.
Index Terms—application security, sandboxing, service man-
ager, Capsicum, compartmentalization
I. INTRODUCTION
Network services and applications have always been attrac-
tive targets for remote attackers. Network services typically
incorporate complex protocol parsing code, often written in
low-level languages, that is exposed to arbitrary content from
the network. Since these services commonly execute with
system privilege, they are at high risk for remote exploitation
as a gateway to other system resources. Because of the risk
and the consequence of potential compromises, there is a need
to confine network applications and limit the damage that can
be inflicted by a successful attack.
One broad class of techniques that seem applicable to
the problem of securing network services is sandboxing:
restricting software’s access to system resources such that the
application has the least privilege required to fulfill its func-
tion. However, applying such limitations is challenging. Many
sandboxing frameworks require invasive code modifications,
some of which require a great deal of security expertise to
apply correctly. Incorrectly applied mechanisms may lead to a
false sense of security without additional effectual protection.
What is needed, in addition to the development of effective
sandboxing techniques, is the development of tools to apply
those techniques.
Sandboxing is applicable through different techniques at
various levels within operating systems such as system call
chroot(2) [1], sandboxing features in service managers such
as systemd [2], or application containers such as jail(8) [3]
or docker [4]. We believe that a great deal of benefit can
be derived from the application of sandboxing at the level
of system services without requiring invasive modifications to
the application code of every network service. Hence, we see
service managers as the key to securing systems with network-
facing services. Securing systems at this level, eliminates the
need for securing every service separately.
In this paper, we have combined process supervision and
FreeBSD’s capability-oriented compartmentalization frame-
work [5], Capsicum [6], to introduce CapExec as a sandboxing
process supervisor (section II), which runs applications in a
restricted capability mode.
Capsicum provides a fine-grained sandboxing mechanism,
giving developers a significant degree of control within an
application. However, some developers still avoid the use of
this technique, or even other sandboxing approaches, for the
following reasons:
• Difficulties of preserving the functionality of the program
while enhancing its security
• Requirement for source code modifications and the addi-
tional associated testing
• Verifying the correctness and compatibility between lim-
its defined in the sandbox
These issues motivated us to facilitate the use of Capsicum
by employing the same ideas in our supervisor program.
CapExec uses Capsicum to restrict the privileges of services,
limiting access to resources from compromised applications; it
uses the Capsicum-based Casper service framework [7], [8] to
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provide access to required resources through capability chan-
nels defined by Casper. To use CapExec, services’ required
run-time resources should be described in service declaration
files, as an initial step to unify security and functionality
descriptions. When a service’s run-time requirements can be
described in terms of Casper services, CapExec provides
sandboxing without any modifications to source code. The
mechanism and its various evaluation results are described
in section II and section IV respectively. This project is
a significant advance beyond the current state of the art
(section V).
II. CAPEXEC: A SANDBOXING SERVICE SUPERVISOR
We have designed and developed CapExec to be a security-
focused service supervisor that executes a service in a sandbox
transparently, which means no modification to the service’s
source code is required.
CapExec creates sandboxes relying on Capsicum [6] and
Casper services. Capsicum is a sandboxing framework devel-
oped for FreeBSD. The fundamental idea for the framework
comes from the concept of capabilities in capability-based
systems [9]. Capabilities are unforgeable tokens of author-
ity carried by processes to authorize access to the systems
resources. Using Capsicums API, once a process enters to
the capability mode, all system calls trying to access global
namespaces, such as the root filesystem or the PID1 names-
pace, will fail. Capsicums sandboxing has changed the regular
flow of the system call mechanism in FreeBSD. In addition
to Capsicums general API, Casper has extended Capsicums
features by defining capability channels to allow access to
some riskier but widely-used services [7].
Using Capsicum and Casper, CapExec creates and loads
required Casper services to provide access to white-listed run-
time resources. These services and their limits are specified in
the application’s declaration files as the service configuration.
CapExec executes one application at the time in a sandbox
made with required Casper’s capability channels. Hence, lim-
ited accesses to the subsetted namespaces are proxied for the
application, but any unprivileged behaviour or requests beyond
defined limits will fail due to capabilities violations.
A. Service Declaration: Unifying Application Functionality
with Security Requirements
CapExec employes libucl [10] to parse the service declara-
tion file conforming to JSON format [11]. The file should de-
scribes the service’s binary and its requirements. Requirements
are those system resources that are disallowed in capability
mode, but their alternative restricted services are supported by
Casper daemon or libcasper API [8]. An example configura-
tion for the traceroute utility is given in Listing 1.
Listing 1. An example of the content of traceroute declaration file
{
binary: "/usr/sbin/traceroute"
"system.fileargs" : {
1Process ID
operations: "OPEN",
flags: "RDONLY",
cap_rights: "READ",
cap_rights: "FCNTL",
cap_rights: "FSTAT",
filename: "/etc/protocols",
filename: "/dev/null"
}
"system.dns" : {
family: AF_INET
}
"system.net" : {
host: "example.com",
family: AF_INET
}
"system.sysctl" : {
"vm.overcommit": {
type: "mib",
flag: "CAP_SYSCTL_READ"
}
}
}
Writing service declarations requires knowledge of system
calls used within the applications code. The problem is compli-
cated by system calls used indirectly by libraries. Recognizing
this issue, we developed CapCheck, a tool for highlighting
library calls that use system calls not allowed in a Capsicum
sandbox. As can be seen in figure 1, even a call to fgets(1)
can result in unexpected system calls that are disallowed in
Capsicum sandboxes.
CapCheck uses readelf and ldd to determine the calls made
to external libraries and the libraries that provide them. It
then builds a full call graph for the application and searches
it to find paths that result in disallowed system calls. This
information is provided to the end user to develop service
declaration files.
{fgets} {__srefill} {__smakebuf}
{__sys_fstat}
{syscall}
{_fstat}
…
…
Fig. 1. Reduced call graph from traceroute(8) showing how a call to
fgets(3) can result in system calls disallowed in Capsicum.
B. Sandboxed Execution
As the first step, CapExec parses declaration files and cre-
ates the corresponding Casper services. In addition to support-
ing all Casper services, CapExec needed a capability channel
for simple network communications. Therefore, we developed
an experimental networking Casper service, system.net, sup-
porting bind(2) and connect(2). After parsing service declara-
tion files, CapExec forks and executes the binary sandboxed in
a child process, creating a new environment or context for the
process, including arguments, libraries, environment variables,
the new runtime linker, shared memory mappings and required
libraries to make the process sandboxed. CapExec replaces
disallowed libc system calls with other functions that redirect
requests to the existing Casper services. As a result, the source
code remains unmodified. Figure 2 shows this mechanism.
Service Manager
Daemon
Casper Services: Limited defined access
system.dns system.grp system.sysctl
libs
svc_config.json
fork
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Application
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dns_service_
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grp_service_
preload sysctl_service_
preload
Parse
libraries  to be preloadedAttach
Fig. 2. CapExec’s approach to run a service in a sandbox
III. CAPEXEC IN PRACTICE
A useful approach to achieve compartmentalization in large
networks is to employ communication and access policies on
subnets. There are always applications such as firewalls and
similar tools to enforce policies in a coarse-grained form of
actions being held on the edge of the system. CapExec is a
solution to have finer-grained enforced policies on services
rather than users behaviors. If administrators can define de-
tailed policies for important system services, then we will have
network services that might be compromised, but they will not
cause information leakages over the network, privilege escala-
tion on servers or other consequence server failures. CapExec’s
dependency on configuration files causes administrators to be
able to run sandboxed network services using simple network
management tools such as running startup or shut down scripts
on specific domains. Limits can be applied to the network
more manageable, centralized, and more verifiable.
CapExec turns application sandboxing from a complicated
and time-consuming procedure into one that is simpler and
faster to implement. To examine this set of tools we sandbox
two of well-known existing utilities, cat(1) and traceroute(8),
on FreeBSD 12.0. In this section, we describe CapExec’s
internal mechanism.
What happens to the process?
Using CapExec, the administrator or developer of the system
can describe required resources in terms of Casper’s services
similar to the example that has been shown in the listing 1.
Suppose that listing 2 is a piece of code for our process.
Listing 2. Software that depends on functionality disallowed by Capsicum
void test_gethostbyname() {
const char *ipstr = "127.0.0.1";
struct in_addr ip;
struct hostent *hp;
if(!inet_aton(ipstr, &ip))
fprintf(stdout, "Unable to parse IP address %s.", ipstr);
hp = gethostbyaddr((const void*)&ip, sizeof(ip), AF_INET);
CPPUNIT_ASSERT(hp != NULL);
}
In the absence of CapExec, the process calls gethostbyaddr(3)
function and the corresponding libc function will be called as
shown in figure 3.
Process
C Standard Library 
(libc)
System Global Namespaces
Groups 
Database Password 
Database
DNS
gethostbyaddr(3)
Kernel System Calls API
Kernel Level
User Level
Fig. 3. The original procedure of calling unsafe functions and accessing to
the system global namespaces
When a process enters the capability mode, all system
calls which try to access the global namespaces will fail. So
the corresponding system functionality will not be met. The
Casper daemons help solve this problem by creating restricted
capability channels to access system resources with limited
privileges. To use Casper services in CapExec, the service
configuration file should contain the following content for our
example:
Listing 3. An example of a service declaration for system.dns
{
"system.dns": {
type: ADDR,
family: AF_INET
}
}
When CapExec parses the file, it defines a capability channel
for system.dns service with specified limits and sets required
libraries to be preloaded later. Preloaded libraries and their
functions retrieve capability channels that are open in the
parent process, which is the main thread of CapExec. In
our example, a capability channel will be established for
the service system.dns. Then calling gethostbyaddr(3) will be
redirected to the channel with Casper’s equivalent function
cap_gethostbyaddr(3). The procedure is shown in figure 4.
As it is mentioned before, to test our application function-
ality on elementary utilities, we tried to sandbox cat(1) and
traceroute(8). cat(1) is a very small utility which needs only
one Casper service, system.fileargs, to open files specified
Process
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CapExec: 
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 cap_gethostbyaddr(3)
Kernel System Calls API
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Fig. 4. The procedure of process execution with CapExec. The process
disallowed invocations are redirected to predefined capability channel in the
corresponding Casper service. Numbers are showing the order of steps.
as command line arguments. Listing 4 shows cat’s service
declaration file that we used to make it sandboxed.
Listing 4. An example of a service declaration to sandbox cat(1)
{
binary: "/bin/cat"
"system.fileargs": {
operations: "OPEN",
flags: "O_RDONLY",
cap_rights: "READ",
filename: "test.txt"
}
}
IV. EVALUATION AND COMPARISONS
1) Runtime Performance: In this section, we describe
evaluation results and our observations about runtime per-
formances, memory usage, correctness, and comparison of
running existing applications, cat(1) and traceroute(8), in
CapExec’s sandbox and other sandboxing technologies. We
have chosen these two utilities as they are both simple small
utilities sandboxed before using Capsicum. Examining these
application allows us to have a direct comparison to traditional
applications of Capsicum requiring source code modification.
To investigate running cat(1) with CapExec, which only
needs one Casper service (system.fileargs), we examined
cat(1) and its sandboxed version with two test scenarios. In
the first scenario, we examined invocations of cat with files
of various sizes from 1 MB to 1 GB, shown in figure 5. Since
a large portion of CapExec overhead is spent pre-opening
and holding handles to file descriptors, in the second test
scenario, we ran our tests with a varied number of empty files
as the input set, from 10 to 10000, shown in figure 6. All
measurements were performed ten times per test case.
As can be seen in figure 6, executing cat in our sandbox
adds overhead to the execution time. We find this delay more
tolerable as the number of inputs grows. The majority of the
cost of using CapExec is spent in setting up the sandbox.
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Fig. 5. Time to open single file with original cat(1) in comparison with cat
running in CapExec’s sandbox
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Fig. 6. Time to open multiple files with cat(1)
This includes the reading of configuration files, the creating
of Casper services and fork(2) calls to load and open them.
Here is how we explain various points affected execution
time with the observed latency. CapExec parses a service
declaration file and then defines essential Casper services
with their specified limits. Opening Casper services is always
associated with calling fork(2) for each service. After all
service definitions, CapExec forks and executes the binary,
in the child process, in capability mode. Hence, the cost
of establishing a sandbox environment and Casper channels
always exist, but just once during runtime, which is negligible
for large inputs, in terms of size. It shows 1% on average in our
cases for huge files, and 1% to 2% for small cases. However,
this step costs more for a large number of files with equal
sizes in our second test scenario. In worst cases of those tests,
it takes over twice of the time. We can explain this issue with
this fact that there is a linear relationship between the number
of mentioned services and their features in service declaration
file and the time required for configuration.
There are additional reasons for the delays seen in our
outputs. The presence of preloaded libraries redirected system
calls and the communication between the sandboxed process
and Casper daemon, all affect process runtime. The increasing
number of Casper services opened by the supervisor program
causes more latency during runtime.
Although we believe these delays are acceptable to achieve
secure services, there are various places in CapExec which
can be optimized. For example, with better sets of service
declaration options, such as Casper fileargs arguments, we
could speed the first phase of sandbox creation. CapExec has
been developed with the most straightforward possible design
as a proof of concept but additional optimization on the current
system is one of our current focuses.
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Fig. 7. Memory utilization for various number of files opened by cat(1)
CapExec’s approach includes the additional cost of
spawning Casper services and CapExec’s preloaded libraries.
In addition to the structures keeping services configurations
and limits, new processes have to be spawned by the
supervisor program. We can see the impact of this design in
figure 7, which shows a broader impact on memory overhead.
2) Completeness and Correctness: We have investigated
the correctness of our sandboxed application through ktrace(1)
output, which provides us detailed information about invoked
system calls and their returned values. For example, in the
listing 5 which is presenting the ktrace(8) output of the un-
modified version of cat(1) program, we can see the disallowed
system call, open(2), which is forbidden in the capability mode.
Listing 5. The trace of the syscall for the cat(1) application.
cat CALL openat(AT_FDCWD,0x80024a010,0<O_RDONLY>)
cat NAMI "test/0"
cat RET openat 3
In Capsicum, when an application tries to access a global
namespace, a capability error is returned, and the intended
system call fails. Listing 6 is demonstrating the capability error
returned from the system call open(2) in capability mode.
Listing 6. The trace of the syscall for the sandboxed application.
cat CALL cap_enter
cat RET cap_enter 0
cat CALL openat(AT_FDCWD,0x7fffffffe990,0<O_RDONLY>)
cat CAP restricted VFS lookup
cat RET openat -1 errno 94 Not permitted in capability
mode
CapExec delegates tasks to Casper services for disallowed
replaced system calls. Requests are sent to Casper services
through a capability channel which passes commands through
UNIX domain sockets to Casper services. We can see this
procedure in the ktrace(8) output shown in the listing 7. The
system call sendto(2), instead of the forbidden system call, is
invoked. We can see that the final open(1) system call was
executed by a different process. Since in our examined appli-
cations, no system call failed and no related capability error
was observed and they worked normally, we can infer that the
corresponding configuration file sufficed for the applications.
Listing 7. The trace of the syscall for cat(1) under the CapExec.
cat CALL sendto(0x4,0x80163b0a0,0x4e,0,0,0)
cat GIO fd 4 wrote 78 bytes
0x0000 6c00 0200 0000 0000 0000 003b 0000 0000 0000
0004 0400 0500 |l..........;............|
0x0018 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 636d 6400
6f70 656e 0004 |..............cmd.open..|
0x0030 0500 0700 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
6e61 6d65 0074 |..................name.t|
0x0048 6573 742f 3000
|est/0.|
cat RET sendto 78/0x4e
[...]
capexec CALL openat(AT_FDCWD,0x800283078,0<O_RDONLY>)
capexec NAMI "test/0"
3) Comparisons with Virtualization-based Solutions: We
have also compared CapExec with equivalent virtualization-
based solutions. There are various aspects to compare these
systems such as required time to set up the sandboxed or
virtualized environment, the complexity of configurations,
required storage for each approach, memory utilization for
each tool and finally the latency of running an application
using each tool. To investigate CapExec against most widely-
used containers, we examined running traceroute(8) under five
situations. First, we ran traceroute(8) on the native system
out of any container or CapExec. For the rest of the cases,
we started the container, ran traceroute(8) on it and then
stopped it. We practiced this procedure on a virtual machine,
a FreeBSD jail, a docker, and finally with CapExec. Figure 8
shows the latency and memory used of running traceroute(8)
using each technology, giving an average of five test runs. It
also shows the time spent to start each container up and to
stop them after the test. Since CapExec runs directly on the
native operating system, we can see that the memory overhead
is negligible.
There are also additional storage requirements for the in-
vestigated isolation techniques. As an example, the size of the
image for a virtual machine, a docker image, and a jail image
in our tests, were 2.6 GB, 204 MB, and 800 MB respectively,
which shows that how much isolating a small application
might cost. This issue makes a light user-level sandboxing
application like CapExec distinguished from other sandboxing
solutions.
Regardless of numerical comparisons, we can compare the
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Fig. 8. Comparison of running traceroute in different environments
mentioned solutions in terms of some other non-statistical
criteria. Here are some of the most significant aspects. Setting
a virtual machine, a jail(8) or a docker(8) container require
considerable time. The time to learn, configure, and run the
first instance of these containers, depends on the underlying
operating system and the user’s proficiency. For the various
secured environment, one should define, create, and install
various images to be virtualized later. In most cases, there
are also post configurations to make the environment efficient
to run the intended application. For example, to run network
services under any of these applications, one might do many
networking and firewall configurations to make the service and
its response reachable through network. This issue holds for
CapExec as well but in a tremendously lightened way. We
believe the time for setting up a sandbox and running a user-
level application, is much less than creating and configuring
each of those containers. To run an application under CapExec,
one should first find all disallowed system call invoked by it,
and this stage could be complicated for unprofessional users.
However, we tried to ease this step with CapCheck.
As the last significant point, all of the described solutions
above need the root privilege to run. While we are trying to
create and run a sandbox under an unprivileged application.
On the other hand, they are still probable to get compromised.
As an example, a virtual machine is itself breakable, so in that
case, the network service running in it will be out of access. To
avoid breaches in the future, a solution is to combine services
running in virtualized containers with other services running
out of them; however, this will add more complexity and effort
to the problem.
V. RELATED WORK
To design CapExec’s scheme, we have studied several
sandboxing mechanisms and service managers, focusing on
their security options. As the most important options, user
permissions and privilege are essential for most of contempo-
rary init systems. Configuring uid and gid in systemd [2], s6
[12] or other service managers, are examples of these options.
However, they are still susceptible to complex attacks such as
those utilizing privilege escalation.
launchd [13], the service manager on macOS, was the first
system that expanded inetd’s [14] socket activation, and was
adopted because of its performance. launchd provides options
for security that are mostly focused on permission features
such as username, groupname, initgroup and umask. The only
option concerning sandboxing schemes is the ability to set
the root directory. The short list of security options in launchd
originated from the internal security scheme of macOS, which
is consistent and well-designed.
systemd [2] is another widely-used service manager in
which various security options are supported. In contrast with
launchd, systemd supports very fine-grained security controls
such as uid/gid control and isolation options such as inacces-
sible or read-only paths, root, and tmp directories. Benefiting
from seccomp [15], system call filtering is also provided.
However, with all of these features, it is left to the developer
to verify the configuration’s compatibility with the use of the
application but it is easy to define inappropriate policies.
There are also other service managers with similar security
mechanisms such as relaunchd, also known as jobd [16], nosh
[17], and s6 [12], which are quite different in design. For
example, relaunchd runs services in jails [3], and its options
are configurable for the user, while most of nosh’s security
features are internal. Also, nosh uses the concept of capabilities
in design. noshs design and mechanism is based on daemontools
which is a package of tools for UNIX service management
[18]. There are also other service management tools inspired
by deamontool such as runit [19] and s6 that are much more
than an init system. s6 is a package of tools including
various security features such as access control management
on client connections, supporting uid-less privileges, ability to
define sudo family [20], etc. Most of deamontool-based service
managers benefit from internal security in their design.
In addition to service managers, we also have studied
widely-used existing sandboxing tools such as chroot(2) as
a sandboxing system call, FreeBSD’s jail and docker that
were examined as containers in section IV, seccomp(2) [15]
as a framework that applies system call filtering, CloudABI
[21] which provides process-level sandboxing benefiting from
capabilities, etc. An interesting point about all of these applica-
tions is the different level at which each of them are providing
sandboxing.
VI. FUTURE WORK
CapExec is a service supervisor that executes one appli-
cation at a time. That application executes in isolation, a
sandbox provided by Capsicum with limited access to global
resources mediated by Casper. However, CapExec is not a
complete service manager. Our intent is to use CapExec as
a foundation for a service manager that handles interdepen-
dencies and sandboxes groups of network services. To aid
in this goal, we are also developing more network-oriented
Casper services. Additionally, we are investigating ways to
reduce the amount of security specific knowledge required
to use CapExec. We aim to make defining security policy
as simple as specifying white-listed resources required by
services, so that CapExec decides which Casper services, with
what configuration, should start.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced CapExec, a prototype sandbox-
ing supervisor that facilitates service sandboxing both on local
and network services. Using Capsicum and Casper, along with
a simple configuration file, we transparently provide this isola-
tion at run time without any modification on the application’s
source code. The system requires to be configured based on
essential Casper services, which is challenging for the user,
but to facilitate this procedure, we provide CapCheck, a tool to
discover system calls that require wrapping. This demonstrates
that sandboxing itself can be a service, a key foundation for
building security-aware service managers in the future.
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